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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM D. MILLETT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE )
STATE OF UTAH-BOARD OF REVIEW,)

No. 16385

Defendant and Respondent.)
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S DENIAL WAS CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE as it did not require repayment of benefits received
by reason of fraud as specified under Section 35-4-6(d) and
assign the remaining overpayment under Section 35-4-6(e) as
specified by statute.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CONTEND THAT THE UTAH STATE SUPREME
COURT HAS IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INTENT OF THE UTAH STATE
LEGISLATURE IN ITS ENACTMENT OF SECTION 35-4-5(e) UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953 AS AMENDED.

Plaintiff does contend that the

Court has not been asked prior to the instant case, to interpret
the intent of the legislature in its enactment of Sections
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35-4-6(d) and 35-4-6(e) as they relate to determinations made
under Section 35-4-5(e) of the Act.
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff states the period of
disqualification for fraud should be less than the 52 weeks
required by statute.

Plaintiff states no such thing.

PlaintiIT

agrees that the claimant who commits a fraud invokes the full
administrative penalty of fifty-two weeks disqualification.
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff states that some monies
received during such disqualification period should not be
included in the attendant overpayment for that period.
states no such thing.

Plaintif

Plaintiff does maintain that such bene-

fits as were not received by reason of fraud or fault can not
be assessed under Section 35-4-6(d).

Plaintiff states that

benefits to which no material infraction attaches and which
are later assessed in overpayment, must be assessed under
Section 35-4-6(e).
Defendant notes that the Employment Security Act makes no
distinction between "simple" fraud and "compound" fraud.
Plaintiff made these distinctions for the sake of definition
on page 14 of his Brief, as the Defendnat noted.

Defendant

suggests that, because the Act makes no such distinction, the
definitions are invalid.
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Plaintiff states that the words of Section 35-4-5(e),
"For the weeks with respect to which he had
willfully made a false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a
material fact to obtain any benefit under
the provisions of this act ..• "
mean that the claimant is disqualified for a 52 week period
for every week with respect to which he perpetrated such fraud
whether or not only one false statement was made.
Plaintiff maintains the definitions are valid and that
reasonable argument has not been made against them.
Defendant states on page 10 of his brief that:
"Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 5(e)
would render a nullity of any penalty except
in those cases where the fraud is discovered
at its inception, for certainly the individual who is required after the fact to repay
only those monies obtained by reason of his
fraud suffers no penalty whatsoever. Such
would be the situation in the instant case
were Plaintiff's interpretation of Sections
35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) to be adopted by this
Court."
Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e) does no
such thing.

The penalty is not nullified and the Court is

reminded that the period of disqualification in the instant
case is still in effect at this

v~ry

moment.

Defendant maintains on page 10 of his Brief that case
number 65-BR-375 in which the Board of Review held that the
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hearings representative lacked jurisdiction to correct an erroneously calculated overpayment, does not relate to the instant
case.

On the contrary, Plaintiff believes the decision cited

shows that the Defendant and the Board of Review have acted
capriciously in interpreting the Act in past cases.

Plaintiff

contends that the department had continuing jurisdiction in
that matter as defined in Section 35-4-6(b) of the Act which
limits review to one year except in cases of fraud or claimant
fault.
Plaintiff contends that benefits received to which no
material infraction attaches can not be said to have been
received by claimant fraud or fault.

As such, that portion

of overpayment to which no material infraction attaches must
be assigned to Section 35-4-6(e), which Defendant quotes on
page 6 of his Brief but with respect to which he made no further
reference.
Defendant has not addressed Plaintiff's argument that
claimant A, whose gross payable on his claim was $3,600 and
who obtained $1.00 by reason of fraud on his first compensable
week receives the exact same penalty as claimant B who receivec
$100.00 per week for 36 weeks by reason of fraud.

Each claim-

ant is disqualified for a 52 week period and each is charged
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$3600.00 in overpayment.
Such an interpretation ignores the mandates of the overpayment sections of the Act, specifically failing to apply
Section 35-4-6(e) to those weeks of disqualification to which
no material infraction attaches.
In this way the determination does not conform to statute,
and is clearly capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable.
POINT III
REFER TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL.
POINT IV
REFER TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above, Plaintiff requests the Court
to reverse Defendant's findings that Plaintiff knowingly withheld material facts of work and earnings, reverse Defendant's
assessment of 52 week disqualification periods, and reverse
Defendant's assessment of overpayments.
For the reasons cited above, Plaintiff requests that the
Court reverse the findings of the Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission.

Plaintiff further requests that the

Court find that the Department of Employment Security and its
Board of Review have improperly construed and misapplied 35-4-5
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(e), 35-4-6(d), and 35-4-6(e) and these statutes have not
been properly applied and requests that the Court overturn
the decision of the Board of Review.
Plaintiff shows that the intent of the legislature and
the rules of equity could be better applied and that there are
alternate methods of collection that could be used by the
Department of Employment Security.

The Plaintiff requests

that the Court overturn the decision of the Board of Review
and instruct the Department of Employment Security to use the
alternate methods available by statute.
Plaintiff further requests that the Court find that the
application of U.C.A. 35-4-5(e), in the instant case, violates
petitioners rights under the Constitution of the United States
and the State of Utah.
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